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Summary  findings
Budgets for extension  services have been reduced in  feasible and has a positive impact, even in a relatively
many countries.  One response to these reductions in  poor country such as Nicaragua. The national  system for
public services in some countries has been to privatize  agricultural technology-transfer  services was redesigned
extension services - with extension  services provided,  to include three main modules:
for a fee, by either public agencies or private companies.  *  Mass media and free demonstrations.
Under the new approach,  producers  become clients  - Cofinanced extension services.
instead of beneficiaries.  *  Private extension services.
Dinar and Keynan examine ways to measure the cost  The relatively high cost recovery rates in Nicaragua
of providing paid-extension  services and its performance  and the economic performance  of the two paid programs
and apply these indicators  to data on Nicaragua, where  show that even poor  farmers are willing to pay for a
paid extension has existed for several years.  service that improves their-economic  efficiency and
Data were insufficient to compare  the quality of  ability to earn a living. To the surprise of everyone
privately and publicly provided extension  services, but  involved, Nicaragua's producer  clients understood  that
available data suggest that the costs of extension  have  without cost-sharing, the system would not endure.
declined over time. Results suggest that paid extension  is
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The Case of Agricultural Technology Transfer in Nicaragua
Introduction
Public Agricultural Extension (Extension), ike many other public services, is at cross roads.  Ex-
tension was also criticized for  inefficiency and  in some  cases for  irrelevancy (Rivera  1996a).
Lately, public budgets for extension activities in many countries were drastically cut and the scope
of the extension work was reduced or modified.  Structural changes in extension provision and fi-
nancing alternatives have been one type of response to the changes in the environment in which
extension in  now  operating  throughout  the  world.  Terms  such  as  private  extension, paid-
extension, commercialized extension, and co-financed extension, are used to express the emer-
gence of a service that is provided, either by public agencies or by private companies, for a fee.
We will use here the term "paid-extension" to describe these versions.
There are several experiences of paid-extension experiences around the world, which are
reported in the literature.  They differ and each case corresponds to the local physical, economic
and institutional conditions under which the agriculture sector operates.  They are also designed
to meet the capacity of the farmers (producers) to co-finance the costs of the service.  Payment by
producers for extension services have been implemented in varying degrees in a number of devel-
oped and developing countries.  A detailed description of these cases can be found in Keynan et
al. (1997).
Arrangements for paid extension, as they are reported in the literature, include (see Key-
nan et al., 1997): (a) direct contracts between governments or municipalities and private consult-
ants to provide extension for a limited period (Nicaragua).  This mode also includes payment rates
that  depend on producers'  income level (Chile, Mexico, Colombia); (b) direct agreements be-
tween producers and extensionists where payment is calculated in terms of crop or profit share
(Ecuador); (c) tradable extension vouchers that are funded and awarded to low income producers
by government, based on certain criteria, and are redeemed by the extensionists upon provision of
the service (Costa Rica); (d) direct contracts between groups of producers and extensionists and
other experts (Argentina, China); (e) a combination of funding via direct payment by producers,
contribution by agricultural organizations, and direct and indirect taxes (France); (f) charge on a2
time-cost basis for certain services (United Kingdom); and (g) negotiated lump-sum per an agreed
project-based activity by the extensionist (Queensland, Australia).
Most of the existing studies provide information on the structure and operation of the dif-
ferent paid-extension arrangements, and, in some cases also some anecdotal results on the costs
and benefits associated with these operations.  However, there is not enough evidence and analy-
sis that can help the reader in reaching a conclusion on the degree of success of certain paid ex-
tension arrangements.
The literature includes several studies that address the economic aspects of paid-extension.
Hone (1991), in a theoretical analysis attempts to estimate the implications of recent use of direct
charges to  finance various rural extension networks  in Australia.  Dinar (1996)  applies an ap-
proach that determines how much to charge for extension services, using an illustrative example
from Israel.  Schwartz (1994) reviews several concepts (amended by case study analysis), such as
public vs. private goods, information transfer, and externalities, which are associated with paid-
extension.
However, several questions still remain to be answered.  For example, can one arrange-
ment for paid-extension that was successfully experienced in one country be duplicated in another
country?  How does one select the appropriate paid-extension arrangement for a given set of con-
ditions?  These  questions  suggest  that  a  methodology  to  compare  between  different  paid-
extension arrangements, is desirable.'
This paper develops a framework for comparing the cost and several performance indica-
tors of various paid-extension programs by using actual data from two types  of paid-extension
programs in Nicaragua, and assessing their performance. 2 The analysis focuses on selected per-
formance indicators and their application using available data from the experience in Nicaragua.
The next section develops a framework for comparison between the two types of paid-extension.
The debate  on public vs. private  extension  continues  to rage among experts in the field. The debate  includes  is-
sues such as should extension  be publicly  funded? Who should pay and how much should be paid for exten-
sion services,  and which segments  in the farming population  can afford to pay for extension?  (See Cary,
1993;  Schwartz,  1994;  and Rivera,  1996a,b). Although  significant,  this debate  is beyond  the scope  of this pa-
per.
2The  purpose  of this paper is not to evaluate  the paid-extension  performance  in Nicaragua  but rather to illustrate,
using available  data from Nicaragua,  the application  of the indicators  developed  in the paper.3
Then in the third section the two systems of paid-extension in Nicaragua are described.  Section
four applies the analytical framework to  available data from two private extension programs in
Nicaragua.  The paper is concluded with suggestions for policy and directions of future research.
A Conceptual Framework for Comparing Paid-Extension Performance
In evaluating the performance of paid-extension, two comparisons have to be addressed.  First, a
comparison between paid-extension and public extension performances and second, a comparison
among alternative paid-extension programs.  Although the analysis should not be detached from
the objectives for which paid-extension was initiated on the first place, there are several basic
economic rules that should always hold.
Extension inputs and outcomes of public extension services can be  measured in many
ways.  They can be measured in monetary terms such as expenditures on fuel, salaries, and train-
ing, and in physical terms, such as number of extensionists or extensionist man-hour employed in
the program.  Extension output also can be measured in a variety of ways, including the number
of farmers contacted by extensionists, farmers' participation in extension activities, changes in ag-
ricultural practices due to the provision of extension, improved farm-level physical performance
(yields, crop varieties, inputs), and increased farm-level profitability.  In the case of private exten-
sion, there is also a need to compare between private and public expenditures on extension.  We
distinguish among four categories of analysis: individual producer  level analysis, agency-level
analysis, government-level analysis, and social-level analysis. In the following sections we provide
a detailed analytical framework for each category, which in turn is the basis for measuring the cost
and some performance indicators of paid-extension in Nicaragua.
Individual  producers
The impact of paid-extension on individual  producers can be estimated in several ways, compared
to performance at the no-extension or at the public extension stage.  First, by improving technical
efficiency, where increase in profit at any given combination of other inputs Xi and X2 is observed
(Figure 1).  Second, by improving allocative efficiency, where at a given technical efficiency ex-
tension increases profits due to a better economic allocation of scarce inputs XI and X2 (see Fig-
ure 2).4
In Figure 1 the extension impact is measured by the ability to move from production iso-
quant YO  to production isoquant Y, (YŽ>Yo). In this model the difference between Y 1 and Yo
may be due to increased yield, or increased revenue (resulting from improved yield quality).
Figure 2 demonstrates how a producer that uses a, units of X 1 and a2 units of X2 to pro-
duce Y can be better off by moving to the left on the production isoquant Y and producing the
same quantity Y by a more economic combination of XI and X2. By realizing the price ratio be-
tween the two inputs, the producer uses now b 1 units of Xi and b 2 units of X2. Extension contri-
bution is translated into the introduction of  cultivation or management techniques that allow the
combination bl-b2.




The bottom line in the individual-producer analysis is to maximize the private net benefit
value.  In a simplistic way a comparison between public and paid extension is measured by the
following condition
[1]  A1 2 - B1 2 _ C' 2 Ab - Bb5
where  A  is revenue from agricultural product,  B  is direct production cost,  and  C  is private
payment for extension services.  The index "b" stands for public extension and the index "12"
stands for paid-extension.  A simple measure for  A - B  might be an aggregation of crop level
performances. 3
In the case of paid-extension, distinction has to be made between the agency/company-
level analysis and the government-level  analysis, where the objectives can differ widely.




Agency/company  level 4
The objective of the  private agency/company that  provides extension services is to  maximize
profits, or to minimize costs.  This is the case when the company is provided by the government
with a fixed allowance per producer.  Governments may regulate private extension to ensure cer-
tain service provision standards.  For example, governments could insist that private companies
3 Crop level cost-revenue  analysis  is probably  the most convenient  approach,  and it is used in many cases in the lit-
erature.
4In  the case  of ATPI this is the local INTA  agency,  and in the case of ATP2 it is the private  company.6
provide some financial outlays for training of producers.  (A comparative analysis of the private
companies' financial  performance may provide the different spending patterns.)
Government  expenses
When considering a move from public to private service provision, the government main objective
is to cut costs.  When privatizing a service, governments might be less motivated by the objective
of improving the performance of the recipient (producer) although this outcome is also expected.
Therefore, from the government's point of view
N 
[2]  XDi+F<  EP
i=l
where  Di is direct payment by government to private extension company i (i=I,...,N),  F is gov-
emmnent  monitoring and coordinating cost  of the private extension companies, and  Ep  is gov-
ernment cost of public extension.
Social  analysis
It is also desirable to compare social benefits in the case of public and paid-extension.  In a bene-
fit-cost analysis framework it is expected that, from a social point of view, society is doing the
same or more with less resources.  There is a danger, though, of comparing very small levels of
performance in public and paid-extension.  One should, therefore, take into account the private as
well as the social costs and benefits associated with the privatization of the service.  A simple ap-
proach would calculate private-level cost-benefit ratios of paid-extension, and then estimate the
additional, if any, social cost associated with paid-extension.  For example, social cost may in-
clude the government payment to private companies (in addition to the farmer payments).  Social
cost  may also  include the  opportunity  cost  associated  with  the  change  in clientele as  paid-
extension takes place.  As was suggested in Dinar (1996), and was also observed in the case of
privatization in the United Kingdom (Dancey, 1993), traditional clientele of public extension do
not get the same extension or any extension services when public extension is privatized.  The so-7
cial objective would be to minimize the differences between private and social B/C ratios.  It is
understandable that in the case of extension, private benefit-cost ratio is different than the social
one.
[3]  |(B/  C)  2(B  /C)121 _> 
where B/C is benefit cost ratio, p stands for "private", s stands for "social" and e  is a small num-
ber.  And
12  N  N  M  N  M
14]  (B / C)12 = B /EDi  + F + EEPij  + EEAGij  + A
i=l  i=lj=l  i=lj=l
where  Pij is payments by producer j to firm i, and AG  is additional production cost of producer
j working with private firm i.  AL is opportunity cost of producers abandoned by extension in the
moves from public to private extension.  AL can be measured as the loss in income by those pro-
ducers, or as the additional funds the government has to allocate to provide other means of exten-
sion to producers that were abandoned (such as pamphlets, radio programs, field demonstrations
etc...).
Paid-Extension in Nicaragua
Agriculture is an important sector in Nicaragua, contributing nearly 25% of the GDP and em-
ploying about 33% of the labor force (Banco Central de Nicaragua, 1997).  Table 1 presents GDP
figures for the period 1990-1997, from which it is apparent that agricultural contribution to the
national GDP is steadily increasing between 1990 and 1996. The increased importance of the ag-
ricultural sector in Nicaragua's  economy further justifies the important role extension services
may play in the country.8
Detailed description of the evolution of public agricultural extension in Nicaragua since
1942 can be found in Keynan et al. (1997).  The last restructuring of the extension services, cre-
ated the Instituto Nicaraguiense  de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (LNTA) 5 in 1993, which brought ag-
ricultural and livestock research and extension under one roof.  INTA is divided geographically
into five regions with its headquarters in Managua.  The regions are all located in the western
(Pacific) and central parts  of the country where there is a larger concentration of economic and
agricultural activity.
In  1995, INTA employed about 160 extensionists (INTA,  1996), serving nearly 21,500
producers in its five regions 6, under the Assistencia Tecnica Publica-basico (ATPb) program.  A
large portion of INTA's  budget is funded by foreign sources.  In the same year, the national
budget was reduced, and INTA's management began to realize that donors' support for public re-
search and extension services was waning.  Under these conditions, it became obvious to INTA
that serious efforts should be made to use existing international assistance in order to  establish a
decentralized, client-oriented, accountable, and efficient extension system.  In this context, it was
also clear that such a system would be sustainable only with the finance commitment of the pro-
ducers.  Under the new approach, producers became clients instead of beneficiaries.  To the sur-
prise of all involved, these clients understood that without their sharing of costs, the system would
not  endure.  Under these circumstances, the national agricultural technology transfer  services
were re-designed to  include, three main modules for service provision: mass media and demon-
stration free of charge (ATPb); co-financed (Assistencia Tecnica Publica Cofinanciada-ATP1);
and private (Assistencia Tecnica Privada-ATP2).  While the first two are provided by INTA's
staff, the third is carried out by private extension firms.  At this stage ATP I  and ATP2 are still
subsidized by INTA.
5INTA's  mandate is to reach small and medium farmers. These include some 170,000  out of a total of 243,000
rural families.
6 However,  based  on FIDEG (1995) Only  8.1% of the 313,845  farmers  in Nicaragua  received  extension  of any kind
from any source.  Ofthe  8.1% receiving extension, 24.1% (6126) were served by INTA.  This discrepancy is
explained  by improper  documentation  of producers  served  by INTA  prior to the 1993  reorganization. For ex-
ample,  INTA's 1997  budget  targets 26,000  producers  through ATPb and over  5,000 producers  through ATPI.
Additional  15,000  producers  are targeted via ATP2.9
Table 1: Total and agricultural GDP in Nicaragua 1990-1996.
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Total  GDPa  18156.2  18127.3  18202.2  18135.9  18742.8  19580.0  20648.2
Agricultural GDPa  4495.3  4420.3  4452.3  4533.4  5021.2  5299.6  5817.4
Share of Agricultural  GDP (%)  25.0  24.3  24.4  25.0  26.8  27.0  28.2
Exchange  rate  140.92b  4.27  5.00  5.62  6.72  7.55  8.44
aMillions  of 1980 Cordobas.
bA  monetary reform in 1988 affected the local currency exchange rate compared to the $US.
Source: For GDP, Banco Central de Nicaragua (1997).
For Exchange Rate, IMF (December, 1997)
Scrutiny of the INTA's  1997 budget of $US 9.09 million 7 budget (INTA, 1997a) reveals
that the total budget consisted of the following: 70.0% public funds, including a loan from the
World Bank which accounted for 30 % of this total; 26% in foreign contributions; and 3.3% pro-
ceeds of the sale of products  and services.  The total number of producers reached by all three
INTA's programs remained 21,500, so the average expected cost of extension provision per pro-
ducer is about $US 423.8  Of the entire $US 9.09 million budget, about 12% is allocated to ac-
tivities that provide extension services to more than half of the producers that are approached by
INTA.  However, ATPb is not the  subject of the investigation of this paper.  Scrutiny of the
INTA's  1998 budget of $US 11.01 million 9 the total budget consisted of of the following: 74.6%
public funds; 23% in foreign contributions; and 2.4% proceeds of the sale of products and serv-
ices.  It  should be emphasized that  INTA's  budget does not  include payments from producers
7 In June  1997 9.20 Cordobas =  I$US.
8 For comparison, figures in Tacken (1997) for the private extension service in the Netherlands, suggest a range of
extension provision cost per farmer between $US1360 and $US1590 for the period 1993 and  1996 (exchange
rate of  1  .7Dfl per $US  I was used).  During this  period, proceeds from producers range  from 26% to 63% of
the  operating cost of the service.  Although the cost of $423 in Nicaragua  is lower than  that in the Nether-
lands, it still should be viewed in the right perspective.  The $423 value is the total budgeted cost, including
the  overhead of the coordinating units  of INTA in Managua.  This value is obviously higher than the direct
cost of extension provision by ATPI or ATP2, as is calculated later in the paper.
9 In November 1997 9.85 Cordobas = I$US.10
participating in ATP1 and ATP2 programs.  These payments go directly to extensionists and to
private firms, who provide producers with contracted extension services.
The Co-financed  Public  Technology  Transfer  Service  (ATP1)
One of the main objectives of the ATP1 was to improve the effectiveness of public extension in
Nicaragua.  Public extension suffered from a lack of accountability, and from absence of monetary
incentives to produce results.  The philosophy of ATP1 is to link the extensionists directly to their
clients, making them  accountable for results.  Good  results  would be rewarded;  poor  results
would affect both income and personal status as the results become publicly known.  The major
mechanism applied was the payment of a small sum by the producer for an agreed service.  Pay-
ment would be made to  the technician and not to the institution, and would be divided among
those providing the service, including supervisors and support staff.  The agreement with the pro-
ducers included the setting of agreed quantitative objectives in terms of crop yields to be achieved
by the technical assistance provided by the extensionist.  Both the extensionist and the institution
were obliged, through this mechanism, to strive to achieve good results.  A detailed description of
the establishment and phasing in of the ATP1 program in Nicaragua can be found in Keynan et al.
(1997).
A pilot stage of the ATP1 program was initiated in 1995 with 289 producers, organized in
14 groups, and served by 17 extension agents (7 more extensionists joined the pilot at a  later
stage).  Although payment for the service reached only 45% of the agreed upon charges, INTA
decided to continue with the program in 1996.  During the first agricultural season of 1996 --the
Primera, 866 producers, organized in 41 groups, signed contracts to receive service.  During the
second season --the Postrera, the number of producers increased to 2,221.  Overall, some 35 ex-
tension agents were involved with the program during the first season, and 93 during the second.
It  is worth  mentioning that  the  demand for  the  service during the  second  season  surpassed
INTA's plan by more than 15%, and that payment by producers was close to 80%, as is shown in
the next sections of the paper.
As can be seen from Table 2, the number of INTA's  extensionists that are involved with
ATP1 is increasing, from 24 in 1995 to 78 in 1996, and 93 in 1997. This number is projected to
increase to its ceiling value of 120 in 1998 and thereafter.  Consequently, the ATPb program is11
being substantially modified in order to  allow INTA to continue to provide some level of exten-
sion to those producers who are unable to pay for extension services.
Table 2: Actual and projected participation and extension personnel in ATP1 1995-1999
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Actual  Actual  Actual  Projected  Projected
Region  Groups  Producers  Groups  Producers  Groups  |Producers  Groups  |Producers  GroupsI  Producers
Al  12  55  43  518  19  445  1990  3370
A2  9  78  101  927  29  244  2170  3142
B3  8  77  94  1179  121  2050  2930  5660
B5  11  46  31  446  81  1205  1665  3000
C6  5  33  41  417  62  523  1760  3450
Total  46  289  310  3473  312  4477  525  10515  930  18622
Extensionists  24  78  93  120  120
GroupstExtensionist  1  .9  34343.0  33  43  7.7T
1roducer/Extensionist  _____J  12.0  T  44.5  ___j48.1  80.3  124.1
Source: Garcia, 1997b.
Figure 3 presents the participation trends during the first two years of ATPl's  existence,
while Table 3 presents recovery rates of producers'  payments for extension.  The exponential
growth in the number of producers (and groups) that joined ATP 1 is explained by the "over ca-
pacity" of extension agents in INTA's  regional offices that could absorb growing number of pro-
ducers.  However, given the present capacity--both professional and managerial--of INTA, these
trends will decrease over time if INTA does not increase its professional and managerial capaci-
ties.12
Figure 3: Participation in ATP1 in the first two years, by agroclimatic seasons
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Table 3: Producers'  agreed upon, and actual payments, and payment rates for ATPl  services
Region  Payments  (Cordobas)
Postrera 1995  Primera + Postrera 1996
bv 6/30/96  by 1/30/97
Agreed  Actual  % paid  Agreed  Actual  % paid
upon  payment  upon  paymen
Al  3258  1457  44.7  23260  12170  52.3
A2  2056  1594  77.5  18742  11561  61.0
B3  3970  2820  71.0  34108  27675  81.0
B5  1410  1410  100.0  5225  1908  36.0
C6  1061  158  14.9  N/A  N/A  N/A
Total  11755  7439  63.3  81335  53314  65
Source:  for  Postrera  1995:  Keynan  et  al.,  (1997);  for  Primera  and  Postrera  1996:  Garcia,
(1997a).
Note: N/A= Not available.13
The Private  Agricultural  Technology  Transfer  Service  (ATP2)
In order  to continue the diversification of its services, in mid-December 1994 INTA invited a
number of private firms to jointly assess the possibility of providing private technical assistance to
small and medium producers.  The use of private firms to provide agricultural technology transfer
services was enhanced by the need to: (a)  use market incentives to  provide better  services; (b)
minimize the risk of a  larger public bureaucracy; and (c)  reduce the costs to the public sector
through a cost-sharing scheme by which the clients would participate in the financing of the serv-
ice.  During the first years of this program, most of the costs are expected to be covered by the
government through a loan from the World Bank.
After several months of demand evaluation, the first contracts --between producers, the
government, and private firms--were signed in August  1995. According to these tripartite con-
tracts, the producers were expected to pay a sum covering about 20% of the cost in the first year,
and their contribution is expected to increase to nearly 80% in about five years.  At the time of
writing, no producer was paying more than 50% of the service provision costs.  An estimate of
the average cost of public extension provision in Nicaragua (based on INTA budget for  1995),
suggests a direct cost per producer of $115/year.  This estimate appears to be quite high com-
pared with actual data for ATP I and ATP2, as can be seen from the analysis in this paper.  Pro-
ducers in five regions were organized in groups and by end-July 1996 some 5,700 producers were
served by 46 technicians and 7 supervisors contracted by 5 firms (each firm is responsible to pro-
vide extension services in a given region).
In contrast to the ATP1 concept, the service in ATP2 covers a wide range of farm pro-
duction and marketing aspects.  The size of the groups varies between 10 and 20 people.  Each
technician serves between 8 and 10 groups and attends between 100 and 150 producers.  Figure 4
provides the participation trends in ATP2 during  the first two years of the program.  Contrary to
the trends in ATP  1, it can be seen in the case of ATP2 that each private company reached its
ceiling quite fast (I to 2 seasons, and in one case in the first season).  This result is directly related
to the government assessment of each company's capacity, and its decision to allow the company
to provide extension services to a given amount of producers.  Given this regulatory rule, firms14
attempt to  maximize their proceeds by approaching  as many producers  as  possible, until they
reach the ceiling imposed by the government.
In the first stage of the work, the company's technician together  with the producers pre-
pared diagnostics of the situation on the farm, identified existing problems, and provided alternate
solutions to upgrade production efficiency.  Jointly with each producer, a production plan and a
training program were designed.  This service is coordinated by a very small unit within INTA.
The main tasks of the unit are to administrate the activity and to guide its implementation.
Figure 4: Participation patterns in ATP2 by private extension companies in 1995-1996
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Note: Two more companies (# 6 and 7) were contracted and joined ATP2 in 10/1996.
Although the ATP2 concept is based on the participation of producers in the cost of the
service provision, the selection of producers whose performance levels are not  satisfactory may
create problems in the recuperation of producers participation payments.  This was the case in the
first season of ATPI 's operation (Auguset 1995).  As a result of non-careful selection of partici-
pant producers, their performance was not satisfactory, leading to objections about paying for the
service on their part.  In the following seasons, farmers were recruited more carefully, accounting
for certain professional skills to allow better implementation of extension recommendations.  By15
the end of 1996, 85 percent of the producers paid their fees, and by the end of 1997, 7 firms pro-
vided extension services to more than 13,000 producers through 102 private technicians and col-
lected 81% of the producers fees (2 firms  joined in 8/97).  Table 4 presents cost recovery rates by
producers for the 7 private companies for the first and second years of ATP2's operation.  In light
of the increasing number of producers--that creates logistical problems of fee collection, the cost-
recovery values of 81% on average (with a range between 64%-96%) are quite impressive.  The
drought conditions that affected coffee production, a major crop in certain regions, accounted for
relatively low recovery rates for companies 2 and 5.
As correctly indicated by one reviewer, there is a potential problem of bias in the analysis
if producers are selected for participating in paid-extension programs.  In such case the impact of
paid extension does not reflect real world distribution of producer ability and real willingness to
pay.  However, for an undertaking such as paid-extension departing from a heavily subsidized
public extension, a selection approach such that was chosen in Nicaragua is fully  justified.
Table 4: Rates of producers payments by companies in ATP2
Company  Recovery  of extension  fees
First  Year (8/95-7/96)  Second  Year  (8/96-10/97)
Recovery  rate (%)  Billing  Actual  Recovery
(Cordobas)  payment  rate  (%)
(Co rdnhb:t
1  87  391,007  367,546  94
2  87  331,828  212,866  64
7  N/A  180,049  237,187  82
6  N/A  142,255  148,360  86
3  83  254,548  237,187  93
4  85  278,865  267,710  96
5  84  477,420  320,893  67
Total  85  2,055,973  1,677,472  81
Source: Estrada-Rizo and Garcia (1997) for the period 8/95-7/96, and Estrada-Rizo (1997) for
the period 9/96-10/97.16
The Basic  Public  Extension  Service  (ATPb)
Although not directly the focus of this paper, ATPb is an extension program that will play an im-
portant  role in the political agricultural arena.  Bearing in mind that  of the total population of
more than 200,000 agricultural producers,  only 40,000 are approached by the three ATP pro-
grams, and only 25,000-30,000 will be contacted through ATP1 and ATP2 by 1999.  In order to
reach the big producer population that is not approached through ATP 1 and ATP2, policy makers
will need to enhance, and diversify  the coverage of ATPb.
Data on ATPb in Nicaragua became available from a study by ESECA (1997) based on
270 representative sample farms.  Some of the information in that study can be used in conjunc-
tion with the performance indicators suggested in the previous section.  Figure 5 shows participa-
tion trends of producers in ATPb between 1993 and 1996.
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Source: Based on data from ESECA (1997a)
Measuring Paid-Extension Costs and Performances in Nicaragua
In this section we will apply the analytical procedures that were presented earlier.  First we will
use some of the findings of ESECA (1997) to derive several performance measures.  Without dis-
tinction between extension programs (see footnote) in the sample of the study by ESECA (1997),17
most producers (94%) applied the recommendations provided by extensionists. Of those applying
the recommendations, 19% reported  a  100% effectiveness, 61% reported  50 to  75% effective-
ness, and 20% reported 25% effectiveness.  Two more measurements of value of extension are
the evaluation of INTA's technical assistance (ATPb+ATPI) and the change in producers'  income
as a result of that advice.  Of the sampled producers,  43% and 50% ranked the service as "very
helpfur' and "helpfur', respectively.  Forty one percent of the sampled producers reported an in-
crease in their income, 47% reported stable income, and 12% reported a decline in income.  These
indicators, although not comprehensive in nature, provide some insight on the impact of INTA's
technical assistance.
Although at this stage it is still impossible to  distinguish between ATPb and ATP  1 pro-
ducers in the ESECA (1997a) sample, some interesting hypotheses can be stated.  Table 5 shows
that of the sampled producers, 25% were contacted once a week, 50% were contacted every fif-
teen  days, and  the  rest  (25%)  were  contacted  between  every three  weeks  and  every three
months. 10 Under conditions in Nicaragua, producer contacts was dependent on the level of acces-
sibility to  the producers,  especially after heavy reainstorms that wash away roads.  Thirty two
percent and 27% of the producers were not  accessible all year round by car and by motorcycle,
respectively.
Table 5: Number of visits by extension agents in the ATPb and ATP1 programs
Frequency  of visits  (days)  7  15  |21  30  45  60  901
Share of population (%)  25  50  3  12  1  3  1
Source: ESECA, 1997a
10 An interesting question is what characterizes  the producers that are more frequently  contacted.  Additional
finding  is that 26% of the sampled  producers  paid for their extension  services  and 74% got it for free. Forms
of delivery  of recommendations  are also split at the same rate. 29% received  written recommendations,  68%
received  verbal  recommendations,  and 3% received  recommendations  in other forms. A hypothesis  for verifi-
cation is that those producers  paying for the service  were also visited once a week, and given written recom-
mendations. Producers  paying  for the extension  belong  probably  to the ATPI program. If this is true, then it
would be easy to compare between  the performance  of the extension agents and the producers in the co-
financed  program and in the traditional  public  extension  program.18
Measuring the Performance of ATP1
We will apply several measurements that utilize available data in order to demonstrate various as-
pects of ATP I's performances and impact.  We start with applying a simple farm-level analysis  to
data available in the Primera 1996 season in order to estimate the gross incremental benefits asso-
ciated with ATP I  technical assistance.  Although this measurement can be the result of many
other factors, it is an indicator that  ATP 1 has had a positive impact on producers'  incremental in-
comes.
Obviously the highly positive result in B3 and the highly negative result in A2 dominate
everything else in Table 6.  As a result, the "average" incremental gross margin of Cd 74,344 is
not as robust as it could be.  Our main objective in using these one-season-specific perfonnances
is to demonstrate the use of one particular indicator in evaluating paid-extension activities.
Table 6: Performance of ATP  I producers in various regions in Primera 1996 (Cordobas)
Region  Incremental income  Incremental  cost  Incremental  gross margin
Al  8843  2460  6383
A2  -455159  8613  -463772
B3  699010  157178  541832
B5  -8485  1614  -10099
Totala  244209  169865  74344
Source: Computed from Garcia, 1996
aNot including region C6 for lack of data.
One indirect measure of the performance of extension is the rate of stability of the pro-
ducer groups in the program.  It is expected that a higher rate of instability (measured by the share
of farmers/groups discontinuing their participation) is a reflection of a lower rate of satisfaction
and a lower rate of extension performance.  However, many random events such as unfavorable
weather conditions may also contribute to low performances.  Table 7 presents data which com-
pares the results between 1995 and 1996.19
Although all the numbers in the right column of Table 7 suggest a low rate of stability of
the groups participating in ATP 1, this can be explained by the relatively early stage of the pro-
gram (second year), and by the inappropriate procedure for selecting the farmers in the various
groups.  However, the high level of farmer and group substitution in ATP I is associated with the
high transaction costs of establishing new groups and  re-assigning of new  farmers to  existing
groups.  These transaction costs are to  be borne by the extensionists who assemble the groups.
These factors should be taken into account when analyzing ATP l's performance.
Table 7: Continuation rate of groups participating in ATP  1 between 1995 and 1996.
Region  Number  of Groups  Groups  Continuing  % of Groups  Continu-
Al  43  8  18.6
A2  101  22  21.8
B3  94  35  37.2
B5  32  3  9.3
C6  41  2  4.8
Total  311  69  22.2
Source: Garcia (1996)
Recent data for seven ATPI extension-providing companies allows a three-year perspec-
tive on the stability of producer-participation (INTA, 1998).  Of the total  15,587 producers con-
tracted for 1997/98, 26% are three year veterans, 39% are two years veterans, and 35% are new
participants in the program.  These figures indicate a better long-term stability of producer par-
ticipation.  Indeed, such analysis should be done, using long-term and aggregated data in order to
provide sensible results.
In calculating the cost of extension provision in ATP  1, we use actual data available for
technical assistance programs  in INTA (Estrada-Rizo and Garcia,  1997).  These estimates are
presented in Table 8.
It appears from Table 8 that the annual average cost per extensionist in the technical as-
sistance programs (ATPb and ATP 1) is $3612.  Figure 6 suggests that about 70% of these costs20
are for salary, 20% are for transportation, 5% are spent on producer training activities, and the
rest (5%), are for administration, utility and other miscellaneous  costs.
Table 8: Monthly ATPl  and ATPb extensionist cost in 1997
Units per month  Cost per unit ($US)  Monthly cost ($US)
Fixed  costs
Salary  1  178  178
Fuel  20 gallons  2.4  48
Maintenance  of vehicle  1  10  10
Per diem  20 days  1.33  27
Sub-total  263
Variable  cost
Stationary  and office  supply  10
Training  20
Electricity  and water  5
Taxes, rents  I
Insurance  2
Sub-total  38
Total per month  301
Total  per  year  3612
Source: Estrada-Rizo and Garcia (1997)
Figure  6: Share of main components in extension provision cost (ATPl)  1995-97
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In order to calculate the cost of providing extension in the ATP I program, and also to de-
rive the cost  of providing extension to  an individual producer in ATPI,  we can use estimates
made by Estrada-Rizo and Garcia (1997).  Table 9 presents these estimates, and Figure 7 derives
the cost per extensionist that is associated with ATP I activities.
Table 9: Allocation of extensionist time and fuel cost between ATPb and ATP I clientele
Percent  of time and fuel  allocated  to ATP  I activities
Number  of ATP  I groups  contacted  by extensionist
1-2  3-5  6-8  9-10
20  50  80  90
Source: Estrada-Rizo and Garcia (1997)
Figure 7: Annual cost and time share for technical assistance (ATP-1 and ATPb) as a function of
the number of groups per extensionist.
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Based on the data presented so far, it is possible to  estimate the cost of providing ATP I
extension services to producers.  In 1995-1997 the number of producers per group was approxi-
mately 11. Therefore, the cost per producer, as a function of the number of groups per extension-22
ist varies between $66, in the case of 1 group per extensionist, and $30, in the case of 10 groups
per extensionist.
Measuring the Performance  of ATP2
In the case of ATP2, there are several private companies that provide extension services to pro-
ducers that are contracted individually,  but are also arranged in groups, such as in the case of the
ATPI  program.  In November  1997, there were  seven private companies providing extension
services, but data on financial reports of the companies are not available for  1997.  In May of
1996, there were  five private extension companies operating in Nicaragua.  Figure 8 provides
their market share in the producer population.
Figure  8: Market  share of the  various private  companies participating in ATP2 in Nicaragua
(1996)
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Source: Based on financial statements submitted to the coordinating unit in ATP2.
In 1997, with the addition of two more companies, the market shares for the seven exten-
sion-providing companies were 13.7, 17.2, 13.4, 13.5, 12.7, 16.7, and 12.8 percent for companies
1, 2,7, 6, 3, 4, 5, respectively (INTA 1998).  In 1997 as in 1996, the market share of the private
extension-providing companies remains more or less equal.23
We were able to calculate the cost of ATP2 extension provision from the financial reports
of the 5 private companies for the period 8/95-8/96.  The share of the major cost components in
the extension provision cost are presented in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Share of major components in extension provision cost of 5 ATP2 companies
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As can be seen from Figure 9, salary is the main component in the cost of extension provi-
sion, varying greatly among the companies.  Transportation cost is also a relatively important cost
component that varies among the companies, mainly because of location issues.  On the average,
72% of the costs was spent on salaries, 10% on transportation, 3% on producer training activities,
and the rest (15%), was spent on administration, utility and miscellaneous costs.
Comparison of the cost share between ATPI and ATP2 provides some interesting results.
Salary cost and expenditures on producer training are strikingly similar, around 70% and 5%, re-
spectively.  Transportation cost share in ATPI  is doubled compared with ATP2 (20% and  10%
respectively), and administration cost are tripled in ATP2 compared with ATP I (I 5% and 5%, re-
spectively).  These two differences can be explained on the ground that (1) private companies in
ATP2, unlike public agencies in ATP 1, have more flexibility  in selecting their clientele, also based
on location, so their transportation costs are minimized, and (2) the administration costs in private24
companies include rent to their managers, which may increase this component in the budget, rela-
tive to ATP 1.
The financial  performance of the five ATP2 companies is presented in Table 10. The cal-
culated average gross margin is nearly 25%, which indicates a sustainable level of profit.  How-
ever, one company has a very low level of performance (8%) that is mainly explained by a low
level of producer fee collection.
Based on the data in Table 10 and Table 12, the per producer cost of extension provision
by ATP2 varies between $53 and $77 per year.  This range is not too far apart from the estimated
cost (between $30 and $66) of extension provision by ATP1, that was calculated earlier.
Another aspect of the financial status  of the private  companies that  provide extension
services to producers under the ATP2 program can be found in Tables 1  1 and 12 below.
Comparison of the private firms data in Table 11 suggest major differences in resource al-
location for visits of farmers.  While firm 1 allocates 24 working days per month for each exten-
sionist, of which 83% (_20 days) are spent on producers'  visits, firn  5 allocates 22 working days
per month for each extensionist, of which 77% (_ 17 days) are spent on visits.  Other interesting
results are the big variation between the firms in both technician training and office work.  If data
on producer performance is available at the extension provider level, It could be used to estimate
more accurate efficiency  differences among the firms.
Table 10: Financial performance of five private companies in the period 8/95-6/96
Item  Company  I  Company  2  Company  3  Company  4  Company  5
Income from INTA  646583.97  613707.98  713207.76  626676.56  621872.28
Income  from  Producers  127957.48  153466.99  170061.60  180000.00  142162.12
Income  from  Other  Org.  9045.86  0.00  N/A  N/A  N/A
Other Income  1229.62  0.00  1378.24  N/A  N/A
Total Income  784816.93  767174.97  884647.60  806676.56  764034.4
Total Operational  Expenses  721893.73  543592.82  697144.33  525279.62  572100.85
Gross  Margin  (share)  0.08  0.29  0.21  0.35  0.25
Cost of extension  per producer  (Cd)  499.57  677.79  489.91  467.33  595.93
Cost of extension  per producer  ($)  56.76  77.02  55.671  53.10  67.71
Note: Based on an exchange rate of 8.8 Cd per l$US in June 1996
N/A means not applicable25
Data available from INTA (1998) for  seven extension-providing companies indicates a
range of cost of extension provision for 1997/98 that varies between $70.98 and $88.43 per pro-
ducer, based on the company.  The average cost for 1997/98 of $79.67 is significantly  lower than
that of 1996/97 ($88.83), and that of 1995/96 ($101.18).  The cost effectiveness trend over the
last three years of ATP2 operations is a reflection of both the experience gained by the private
companies, and by the competition regulated by INTA.
Table I 1: Extensionists' allocation time for extension in the 7 private companies of ATP2 as of
10/1996
Number  of  Working Days  Distribution  of Technicians'  Time  among  Activities
Company  Technicians  per Month  Visits of Producers  Technican's  Training  Office Work  Misc.
Days  %  Days  %  Days  %  Days  %
I  10  24  20  83.3  2  8.2  1  4.2  1  4.2
2  7  24  20  83.3  2  8.3  2  8.3  - -
7  6  23  18  78.2  2  8.7  2  8.7  1  4.4
6  8  24  20  83.3  3  12.5  1  4.1  - -
3  11  22  18  81.8  1  4.5  2  9.1  1  4.5
4  10  22  18  81.8  2  9.1  2  9.1  - -
5  8  22  17  77.3  2  9.1  3  13.6  - -
Another trend worth-mentioning is the producer payment schedule.  First-year participat-
ing producers pay 20% of the extension cost; second-year participating producers pay 30% of the
cost, and so far, third year participating producers pay 50% of the cost.  This schedule is expected
to reach 100% cost recovery in five to eight years.  Finally, the total cost of the extension provi-
sion in 1997/98 will be borne as follows: producers 31.7%, the government of Nicaragua 18.5%,
and a World Bank loan 49.8%.26
Table 12: Extension provision situation for the 7 ATP2 private companies as of 9/1997.
Company  Number of  Number of Mu-  Number of Local  Clients  as  % of Clients  Number of  Number  Groups per  Producers per  Clients as of
"Departmentos"  nicipalities  Communities  of  continuing  Extensionists  of Groups  Technician  Technician  12-31-96
Served  Served  Served  3097  from last
year
1  2  10  82  1710  69.4  13  105  8.1  131  1445
2  3  15  92  2333  25.8  25  97  3.9  93  802
7a  1  6  83  1200  N/A  8  83  10.4  150  1423
6a  2  6  39  1294  N/A  8  63  7.9  156  1124
3  2  5  49  1078  58.8  8  63  7.9  135  960
4  1  3  63  1344  70.4  9  63  7  149  880
5  1  4  47  1200  60.0  10  100  10  120  421
Total  12  49  455  10159  40.2  81  574  7.1  125  7055
Source:  Estrada-Rizo  (1997).
aOperational  from 10-96.27
So far the data available also allows a comparison some indicators between ATP I  and
ATP2.  For example, it seems that the work load on ATP  1 and ATP2 extensionists is similar.
While in 1995-1997 ATP  1 extensionists were responsible also for ATPb activities (and therefore,
impossible to compare their workload),  it is envisioned that in 1999 they will only be engaged
with ATP  1 programs.  Therefore, the projected indicators of ATP  1 for 1999 (groups per exten-
sionist, and producers per extensionist) in Table 2 while compared to that in Table 13 for ATP2
suggests a similar work load measured in the number of producers  per  group, and number of
groups per extensionist.
With all the available data at hand, it is possible to calculate meaningful benefit-cost indi-
cators, as was suggested in the analytical framework section.  We present such analysis for one
ATP2 company (#4) in Table 13.  As can be seen from the table, the private cost benefit ratio is
higher than the social one, not taking into account the government subsidy to the companies.  The
indicators also do not  include opportunity  cost associated with terminating the existing ATPb
program.  Once the  costs of the enhanced ATPb program considered by the govemment are
available, it would be possible to calculate a revised benefit cost ratio.28
Table 13: Social and private benefit-cost ratios for a representative ATP2 extension firm in a given region (Cordobas)
Value of  Direct  cost of  Gross margin  Producers  payments  Transfer  to firm by  Private  cost-benefit  Social cost-
production  production  for extension  government  ratio  benefit  ratio
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
(1)-(2)  (3)/(2)+(4)  (3)/(2)+(4)+(5)
30,393,420  16,375,867  14,017,553  180,000  626,676  1.835  1.769
Source: Servitec S.A. (1996)29
Conclusions and Policy Implications
As a growing number of governments privatize their extension services, there is a pressing need to
establish procedures for paid extension evaluation, and to compare both cost and performance of
public vs. private services, and among various private services.  This paper develops and applies a
framework aimed at measuring cost and some performance indicators of paid-extension.
Although paid-extension is being discussed for many years among extension and public
policy experts, economic data on this subject is difficult to  obtain.  The data available from two
types of paid-extension programs  in Nicaragua for the last 3 years, provides important ground-
breaking information, which can augment our understanding of private extension services.
There are several issues to be derived from the available information from Nicaragua:
1.  Improvement of the services provided with paid-extension compared to public extension. One
of the objectives of paid-extension is to improve service to producers.  Although the data is
insufficient to compare public vs. paid-extension quality of service, it is apparent from the in-
creasing and stable participation figures, that producers are satisfied with the service.  Future
investigation should focus on identifying  producer satisfaction levels.
2.  Cost effectiveness of the service.  It appears from the available data that extension provision
costs are both lower and decreasing over time.  This variable of extension cost has a direct
bearing on both the quality of service by the extension agency/company, and the ability and
willingness  to pay by the producers.  The optimal level of extension provision cost needs to be
determined on the basis of the long-term objectives of the system and the original level of
producer production.  Substitution between high extension costs and high performance levels
is a subject for further investigation.  In the case of Nicaragua, the estimated extension cost
for ATP1 are lower than those  for ATP2 ($30-60 compared with $50-70).  This difference
can be explained by the number of producers per extensionist (in 1996 it was 58 and  125, re-
spectively for ATP 1 and ATP2).  Indeed, ATP 1 is aiming at increasing the number of produc-
ers per extensionist by moving away from providing ATPb extension services. These services
will be provided using a mass media approach (ATPm).30
3.  Cost  recovery  of the  service.  Cost  recovery rates  as  reported  for  ATPl  (63%-65%  in
1995/96) are lower than those for ATP2 (81%-85% in 1996/97), but still, both programs indi-
cate cost recovery rates that are at the same level as in other countries (e.g., Netherlands--see
footnote  7).  Cost recovery is an important aspect of private extension.  Although we wit-
nessed relatively high rates, it would be desirable to increase cost recovery to  100%, in order
to continue providing these services and to ensure that they are not affected by budget cuts.
It appears that the principle of private decision makers equating the value of extension
services to the cost of such services works even in a poor country such as Nicaragua.  Once they
realize their full potential, producers are prepared to  pay for information and knowledge.  Al-
though too early to conclude, it seems that the two paid extension systems in Nicaragua achieved
the objectives of improving extension services, and of increasing agricultural production and pro-
ducer profitability.  However, there are several fundamental policy questions that  could be re-
searched further:
1.  the distribution of the paid-extension benefits among different classes of producers is an im-
portant question, affected by the payment method (e.g., per farm, per visit or per unit of land);
2.  the impact of paid-extension on the poor and on subsistent producers, who may be left out,
unable to pay for the service, when public extension is replaced by paid-extension;
3.  the social cost of non- or alternative extension methods to substitute public extension for the
poor and subsistent producers.
4.  the long-term sustainability of paid extension in developing countries needs to be re-examined
once external fimding for paid-extension projects are gone, and to check the effectiveness of
mechanisms to ensure their self sustainability.31
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